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1. The Problem: Obeying rules of pragma-dialectical model in real life is unreasonable 
 
Within the pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 
2004) discussants try to resolve a difference of opinion in a maximally rational way. 
These rational agents are willing to engage in long-lasting and most complex 
discussions and sub-discussions when assessing the plausibility of standpoints. Other 
needs have to stand aside. In order to account for rhetorical moves, the concept of 
strategic manoeuvring has been added to the pragma-dialectical model (van Eemeren & 
Houtlosser 1999, 2006; van Eemeren 2010), with rational agents aiming for rhetorical 
effectiveness while still maintaining dialectical standards of reasonableness. However, 
the extended pragma-dialectical argumentation theory does not account for systematic 
interaction between rhetoric and dialectics. Rhetoric is a supplement that may be taken 
into account, a non-rational appendix to rational argumentation that has to subordinate 
to the demands of the dialectical rules (cf. a similar critique by Hohmann 2000). 
 A specific problem arising from the idealizations of the pragma-dialectical 
model is that it cannot be implemented in real life. As pointed out by van Eemeren 
(2010, p. 4), “the ideal of a critical discussion is by definition not a description of any 
kind of reality but sets a theoretical standard that can be used for heuristic, analytic and 
evaluative purposes”. The model establishes normative standards of reasonableness for 
criticizing arguments, but it does not provide rules for constructing rationally justified 
arguments in practice. 
 To illustrate this last point, let us see where the ideal model of pragma-dialectics 
takes us, if we strictly obey its rules, i.e. if we proceed in a strictly rational and 
dialectical manner. According to rules 7 and 8 of the ideal model (van Eemeren 
& Grootendorst 2004, pp. 147–151), all premises and justifications of an argument that 
were left implicit need to be reconstructed, in case of any doubt, by means of the 
intersubjective explicitization procedure and the intersubjective testing procedure. 
These procedures ensure a mutual understanding of the premises and argument 
schemata that have been used in an argument, and they test whether these premises and 
schemata are admissible and have been applied correctly. One can imagine how large 
the expenditure of time would be in real life if agents would follow these rules. Almost 
every argument contains one or the other implicit premise. The propositional content of 
statements is fuzzy and the formal shapes of argument schemata are far from clear. It 
may take hours for the discussants to agree on the precise content of a proposition or the 
shape of an argument scheme and its applicability. Usually, the validity or invalidity of 
an argument depends on just those formal and semantic particulars (cf. also Krabbe 
2007 on the functional overload of the opening stage with such issues). 
 Perfectly rational agents, however, would never let this keep them from 
resolving their difference of opinion in a maximally rational way. Thus, they accept a 
rule that one would better not insist on in real life: The protagonist may at any time 
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retract any speech act that he has performed (rule 12 in van Eemeren & Grootendorst 
2004, pp. 153f.). This is to say that the antagonist has to accept that the protagonist puts 
forth claims consecutively, just to retract them one after the other. Expenditures of time 
carry no weight in the ideal model, after all. This course of action is rationally justified 
as long as the testing out of several claims serves rational objectives. There is only one 
thing that must not happen even without any time pressure: discussants must not end up 
with an infinite regress. That is why the following rule holds in the ideal model: The 
protagonist and the antagonist may perform the same speech act only once, and they 
must in turn make one move of speech acts (rule 13 in van Eemeren & Grootendorst 
2004, p. 154). 
 The rules presented so far are normative. Any deviation from the rules counts as 
a fallacy, i.e. as a deficient move in argumentation (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 2004, 
pp. 174ff.), a derailment of strategic manoeuvring (van Eemeren & Houtlosser 2006, 
pp. 387f.; van Eemeren 2010, pp. 187ff.). If we compile a catalogue of those fallacies, 
we find quite useful moves on this list such as: presenting pros and cons in a systematic 
way is fallacious as you are allowed only one speech act in turn; at the same time, 
repetitions of speech acts, e.g. due to noise or misapprehensions, are not allowed in the 
discussion; premises that are taken as a matter of course must not be left implicit, but 
have to be made explicit as soon as an argument is challenged; the same holds for 
argument schemata, they have to be made explicit and be tested for their correct 
application. 
 The fact that these rules are hardly ever met in real life need not be of any 
concern to the ideal model, as it is absolutely legitimate to make idealized assumptions. 
The more so as these rules are not meant to be used for conducting real-life 
argumentation. What is astonishing, however, is that adhering to these very rules of the 
ideal model seems highly unreasonable in real life, although the rules should specify a 
rational course of action. Why is it, then, that not following the pragma-dialectical rules 
seems reasonable rather than irrational? 
 
 
2. A problem analysis: Human constraints are not taken into account 
 
Although the ideal model might work in an idealized world it would hardly be 
applicable in real life. And the reason for being so seems quite obvious: human beings 
are by nature subject to various constraints, and it is these constraints that make 
obedience to the rules seem irrational. Among the most important human constraints are 
the following. 
 
(1) The limit of time: Humans do not live forever, and therefore they cannot discuss 
issues forever. 
(2) The limit of information: Humans only have limited access to the information 
relevant to their decisions. Sometimes they have to argue on the basis of 
premises the applicability of which has to be assumed but just cannot be 
verified. 
(3) The limitations of memory: Sooner or later, humans forget the things they hear. 
Most humans are not able to follow a discussion without losing one or the other 
information. 
(4) The limits of rationality: Humans cannot pursue the resolving of a difference of 
opinion in a perfectly rational way simply because they are not perfectly rational 
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agents. Instead, they have emotions and intuitions, which they rely on in social 
contexts, and this is what they do within discussions, too. 
 
By largely ignoring these limitations the pragma-dialectical model decreases its 
applicability in the real world. Nonetheless, a more applicable model can be derived 
from the ideal model by systematically taking into account the limitations of human 
beings. 
 
 
3. The solution: A rhetorical model of argumentation 
 
The question then is: If agents are aware of their limitations, how could they best deal 
with them? How may they arrive at a result that is as close to the ideal result as 
possible? Rhetoric offers answers to these questions by recommending well-proven, 
problem-oriented guidelines for discourse. Rhetorical considerations permit the 
effective composition of a speech. They cannot neutralize human constraints, but they 
can reduce the negative effects of these constraints. 
 A praxis model of rhetoric has to be put next to the ideal model of pragma-
dialectics in order to understand the rationality of real-life argumentation. It is not 
idealized, perfectly rational homines dialectici that act within such a praxis model, but 
homines rhetorici with limited time, limited rationality and limited memory. Homo 
rhetoricus is quite aware of his limitations, and he tries to reach the best result under the 
given circumstances. He knows about his limited memory that makes him forget things. 
He knows that supposed premises may be false and that this could lead to false 
conclusions. He knows about his limited rationality that goes against rationally justified 
results. However, he tries to get the most out of the resources available. His objective is 
to persuade the recipient nonetheless. He merely succeeds in reaching a compromise 
between invested time and desired thoroughness, between logical complexity and 
logistic efforts, between plausibility and rationality (a similar idea can be found in 
Jacobs 2006). The sustainability of these compromises must prove in the course of time 
by success or failure of diverse rhetorical strategies and by their consequences in 
practical life. 
 
3.1. Two simple examples: Alliteration and metaphor 
 
Three examples (two simple ones and a more complex one) may illustrate the idea. The 
rather simple ones concern alliteration and metaphor. Below are given some well-
known advertising slogans. 
 
(5) Don’t dream it. Drive it. (Jaguar) 
(6) Britain’s best business bank (Allied Irish Bank) 
(7) Today Tomorrow Toyota (Toyota) 
(8) Persil - washes whiter. (Persil) 
 
Advertising slogans need to be short and memorable to be successful. And the 
memorability of the slogans just cited is established by alliterations. Those mnemonic 
sentences are imprinted not only on the speaker’s memory, but also on the hearers’ 
ones. With respect to a praxis model of rhetoric this means that figures of repetition, 
like alliteration, are a direct answer of rhetoric to a concrete problem that homo 
rhetoricus has, namely that of limited memory. 
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 The second example concerns metaphors in science. I choose the Bohr Model of 
atoms. Bohr’s model depicted atoms as small, positively charged nuclei that are 
surrounded by electrons, and these electrons travel around the nucleus just like the 
planets move around the sun in our solar system. Although this model is obsolete in 
modern physics, the metaphor is still alive in modern theories that speak of atomic 
orbitals, electron clouds, and wave-like behaviour of particles. These metaphors 
acquired the function of names for abstract relations. It seems that metaphors like 
“orbit” or “path of an electron” are helpful, if not necessary, to envisage extremely 
abstract configurations. If I think of an “orbit” and the “path of an electron” I 
automatically think of small globules revolving around a central nucleus, i.e. I am 
transferring a concrete image in my mind to an abstract relation. This is an original 
rhetorical technique – with all its problems and dangers. Metaphors help to imagine 
abstract ideas. They transform abstract entities into concrete entities. And it is the 
concrete things that humans can best think about. Metaphors thus fill in linguistic gaps 
so that we may articulate concepts that we otherwise would not have been able to talk or 
even think about. With respect to my praxis model of rhetoric, this means that linguistic 
and cognitive limits of homo rhetoricus are compensated for by the rhetoric mean of 
metaphor. 
 
3.2. A complex example: Usage declaratives 
 
As a third and last example the rhetorical function of usage declaratives is to be 
analyzed. Usage declaratives are speech acts that explicate the usage of a word, for 
example definitions or paraphrases of a certain term. From the language economic point 
of view, paraphrases of a term (and the like) are violations of the commandment of 
brevity: “If you can say it with fewer words, then do so!” The use of more words than 
necessary is justified only (a.) if quality rises with quantity, that is: if you can say it 
more precisely by using more words. Or (b.) if it saves you words in the long run by 
introducing definitions. 
 The rational justification of the second possibility is quite straightforward. If one 
needs fewer words by introducing new terms, then the usage declarative indirectly 
meets the requirements of brevity. But what about the first possibility that quality rises 
with quantity? What is the rational justification from homo rhetoricus’ point of view? 
Does not the use of ambiguous terms offer rhetorical advantages, if you do it right? The 
solution proposed here goes as follows: Homines rhetorici are well aware of the fact 
that they do not have precise expressions for everything in their language. However, 
their limited rationality suffices to recognise that imprecise wordings may lead to 
misunderstandings. If discussants understand one and the same term in different ways, 
for example, they might think that they have a difference of opinion, though they both 
agree concerning the issue and only construed a term as different meanings. Or the other 
way round: they use the same term, but mean different things. It might appear as if they 
agree, although they diverge in substance. 
 But every speaker knows, at the same time, that his audience knows about the 
problem of vagueness. Homo rhetoricus anticipates this problem in his communication, 
and he tries to avoid any obscureness that could, from his point of view, become a 
problem. It is because of the available language, the limited rationality, the limited time 
for preparation, that he cannot avoid all ambiguity. It is not because he would act in bad 
faith. 
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3.3 The functionality of ethos 
 
But why, then, should homo rhetoricus not deceive and mislead his listeners by 
vagueness? After all, he subordinates everything to the goal of persuading his audience. 
The reason is that there is a subsequent speech for every homo rhetoricus, when he has 
to step in front of an audience once more, and the audience again knows about the 
problem of vagueness. If in the meantime it should prove that he manipulated and 
misled his audience last time, then he would find it much more difficult to persuade his 
audience once again. (This is not the universal audience that Perelman & Olbrechts-
Tyteca 1969 employed and which Tindale 2006 also relies on to ensure rationality. It 
rather is a particular audience consisting of imperfectly rational individuals). 
 Rhetoric introduced the technical term ethos, denoting the overall moral 
character of a person, his habits, his conducts, and his convictions. Every homo 
rhetoricus carries around with him such an ethos mark. Every convincing speech raises 
his ethos in the listeners’ view, if it proves of value in the long run. Every speech that 
turns out to be demagogic lowers his ethos in the listeners view. Ethos is a moral asset. 
Homo rhetoricus cannot afford to squander his credibility because his actions are geared 
towards long-term success. His arguments are always evaluated against the background 
of his credibility. On the one hand, the arguments of a notorious liar do not count. On 
the other hand, it is only with great effort, that the arguments of an acknowledged 
authority can be challenged. 
 If, for example, the sky diving instructor tells me to put on the harness this way 
around, as otherwise I should not be safe, then I would need very good reasons for 
rejecting his advice. In case of emergency, it does not occur to many of us to question 
the expert opinion and trust the lay assessment instead. The instructor has a self-interest 
in his customers’ reaching the ground safely. His reputation depends considerably on 
that. This is why he would not mislead us. But if an unknown skydiving pupil tried to 
convince me that it would be a better idea to put on the harness the other way round, 
then I have every reason not to let me be convinced. There is not enough deposit in his 
ethos account. Even if his arguments sound as plausible as possible, he still would not 
be able to compete with the instructor’s opinion. 
 Taking ethos into account, effects that in rhetoric the status of a person gains 
importance. Which is, from a pragma-dialectical point of view, a deviation from the 
rational course of action. But in practice we have to rely on the assertions of other 
people, as no one can know everything and verify everything. And this is why the 
accumulation of credibility – of ethos – is so important. Scrutinizing all proponents’ 
standpoints in conformity with the pragma-dialectical rules would impede not only all 
of our communication activities, but would impede most of our actions. 
 
3.4. Rules within the praxis model 
 
Certain rules hold within the praxis model of rhetoric, which are normative, just as the 
rules in the ideal model of pragma-dialectics are. In contrast to the dialectical ones, 
though, these rules have to be applicable in practice and have a chance to lead to results 
in real life. A normative persuasion rule is on top. 
 
(9) Persuasion rule: “Try to maximize your success of persuasion in the long run!” 
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The main objective of homo rhetoricus is to win discussions. He wants to persuade 
others, not figure out the truth. The ethos mechanism acts as a counterbalance to this 
dangerously egocentric rule. 
 
(10) Ethos mechanism: “Every conviction effected by the speaker that proves 
untenable, lowers the ethos of that speaker, and therewith the persuasive power 
of all consecutive contributions of the speaker who is made accountable for 
effecting the untenable conviction.” 
 
As homo rhetoricus is to maximize his long-term success over a long sequence of 
contributions, he needs to take into account the ethos mechanism whenever he puts 
forward an argument, since the ethos account cannot be high enough for reaching the 
long-term success. 
 Regarding the disposition of a speech, I assume a normative rule of disposition. 
 
(11) Disposition rule: “When speaking, take into account the constraints that you and 
your recipients are subject to.” 
 
The constraints mentioned here regard the available time, language, memory etc. The 
use of various rhetorical means can be derived from this rule: shortening, amplification, 
repetition, and metaphor. These methods are permitted as long as they serve the 
resolution of a problem that arises from the limits of homo rhetoricus. 
 No more rules are needed to get the model started. The interaction of the ethos 
mechanism and the normative rules should result in the effect that it would be 
unreasonable and irrational for homo rhetoricus to pursue persuasive success by 
rhetorical tricks. The looming decline in ethos prohibits short-term thinking. 
 
 
4. Summary 
 
Limits of time, language, rationality, and so on prevent human beings from strictly 
obeying the rules of the ideal model. The most rational solution to this problem is to 
deviate from the rules. The rhetorical model offers a rational justification for a 
compromise between an ideal acceptability check and the constraints that apply in 
practice. This compromise is associated with both a cost and a promise. The cost 
consists of uncertainty whether the maximally rational solution has been reached. The 
promise is that no better solution could be reached under the given circumstances. 
 The optimality of rhetorical compromises can only be guaranteed over a whole 
series of discussions. Hence the most important rule within the rhetorical model is: “Try 
to maximize your success of persuasion in the long run!” The ethos mechanism acts as a 
counterbalance. It assures that every untenable conviction effected by the speaker 
lowers the ethos of that speaker. And this also lowers the persuasive power of his 
consecutive speech acts. Various rhetorical means can be derived from the rule of 
disposition. These figures are aimed at dealing rationally with the constraints of time, 
language, memory, and so forth. 
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NOTES 
                                                 
1 I would like to thank two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on an 
earlier draft of this paper. The remaining shortcomings are my own. 
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